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This paper proposes a sociological model for understanding the social appropriation 
of information and communications technology (ICT). It is argued that the relationship 
between a media form and the society in which it is deployed is of key import in 
understanding how media is used. An account is given of the way in which the power of 
ICT to affect society has been understood. It is argued that positions within this debate 
are deeply tied to Western cultural beliefs and values. An alternate model of technology 
is proposed. In this model ICT is regarded as ‘modal’ in operation, that is, it may operate 
differently in different situations.  
  
Introduction 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been widely understood to bring about 
social change. For example, ICTs have been thought to: invigorate economic systems (Gates, 2000), 
empower citizens (Gore, 1994) and even contribute to social and psychological well-being (Cole, et al., 
2001). This article advocates a slightly different position; that the ability of a media or technology, such as 
ICT, to bring about change is tied very much to the social form of the society in which it is deployed. The 
manner in which a technology is used, its “local” appropriation, is argued to be more closely linked to the 
social organisation of the society in which the technology is deployed than any essential qualities the 
technology itself is understood to possess.  This argument was, of course, initially set forth by Raymond 
Williams (1974). Moreover, it has received a partial re-articulation by a number of academics in recent 
years, (Slevin, 2000; Miller & Slater, 2000; Selwyn & Gorrard, 2002) but has seemingly lost out to the neo-
McLuhanite approaches advocated by numerous techno-optimists (Bolter, 2002).  The emergence of 
Community Informatics as an academic discipline presents an opportunity to re-engage with the social side 
of ICT. Indeed as Selwyn and Gorrard contend “there is clearly a pressing need to step beyond the 
limitations of previous analyses of ICT if we are to gain a deeper understanding… We need to be aware of 
the social, cultural, political, economic and technological aspects of ICT–the ‘soft’ as well as the ‘hard’ 
concerns” (p. 6).  As Harris (2002) and Taylor (2004) both indicate, Social Informatics is a discipline that 
requires focus to be placed not upon the rarefied use of ICT but upon their use in social situations. In such 
situations, the “dominant referent discipline” (as Harris suggests), moves from economics and marketing to 
social science. This shift to a social scientific, if not a sociological, critical idiom incorporates an implicit 
re-emphasis upon social factors in the understanding of the use of ICT. 
Much early literature on the subject of the social use of ICT incorporated a sense of “technological 
utopianism”. ICT was understood as a means by which desirable values, understood to have been lost in 
recent times, could be restored. Rheingold (1993), for example, utilising an instrumentalist conception of 
technology usage, proposed, “one of the explanations for the virtual community phenomenon is the hunger 
for community that grows in the breasts of people around the world as more and more informal public 
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spaces disappear from our real lives” (p. 6). Similarly Schuler (1996), with a more technological 
determinist approach, contended that virtual communities “can—in concert with other efforts—play a 
positive role in rebuilding community by strengthening…. core values” (p. 34). The emphasis here has 
been very much along liberal progressive lines and perhaps narrow conceptualisations of communities, core 
values and “positive” roles.  
Such opinions can be seen as examples of a belief in the power of ICT to provide a “technological fix” 
(Selwyn & Gorrard, 2002)—the ability of technology to solve complex social problems. Leaning (2004) 
argues that such an interpretation of ICT arises as ICT has primarily been studied in societies in where such 
beliefs are the common currency. ICT is imbued with a potency to restore liberal values as it has primarily 
been studied in societies where such values are desirable and perceived as being threatened. This argument 
resonates strongly with the views of Downing (1996), who argues for the study of ICT (along with other 
media forms) outside of the traditional laboratories of Western Europe, North America and Oceana. 
This article continues this line of argument. It is asserted that ICT’s potency to cause change is closely 
tied to the society in which it is deployed and, furthermore, attention should be placed upon both the 
technology and the society equally. As Miller and Slater (2000, p. 11) argue, “if you want to get to the 
Internet, don’t start from there”.   
However, the relationship of ICT to social form has as yet to be fully explored. This article is 
concerned with sketching a sociological model by which the relationship of ICTs to society may be 
understood. This proposal consists of two arguments. The first is that current understandings of the way in 
which technology is used, appropriated and affects society derive from the experience of technological 
development and the philosophic interpretation of this experience in Western societies. In many instances it 
is the West’s experience of technology that has shaped and informed the general cultural interpretation of 
how technology can and should be deployed and used. Regarding the West’s experience as universal is 
problematic for, as Hård and Jamison (1998) propose, cultural tradition plays a considerable part in 
conceptions of technology and technological power. What is required is recognition that current 
interpretations of the power of ICT are deeply and historically situated within a Western cultural milieu. 
The intricacies of this interpretation need to be foregrounded and examined.   
Secondly, an alternate model of how technology may operate in relation to society is needed.  While 
the current model of ICT power is intricately bound up with a Western interpretation, it must be 
acknowledged that technology and social form do exist in a close relationship. What is needed, therefore, is 
a model of technology that does not “close off” non-Western cultural interpretations of technology. This 
model regards technology not as in some way an external force affecting society, but as a phenomenon 
constructed, appropriated and understood by society. The model conceptualises technology not as a fixed 
external, eternal aspect of the social world but instead as a part of the social world. Accordingly, ICT 
should be regarded as something operating and existing in a plurality of forms. Technology needs to be 
understood as something that may interact with society in various ways. It is proposed here that ICT be 
understood as being “modal”—something that may be used in a particular way in one society but in a 
different way in another. Technology possesses no quality that necessitates its particular form of use or 
societal level consequence. 
 
The Understanding of ICT’s Relationship to Society 
Underpinning discussions of technology, such as contemporary discourse surrounding ICTs, are deeply 
felt, but often unarticulated, assumptions of how technology and people interact. The relationship between 
technology and society, particularly in discussions concerning new technologies, is often assumed to be of 
a simple deterministic nature; the introduction of new technology causes social change. However there are 
slight, historically situated, variations to this model. In proposing a philosophical-anthropological 
orientation to the study of technology, Feenberg (1999) contends that within modern discourse the 
relationship of technology with society has been conceived of in a number of different ways. Using a 
broadly Kuhnian (Kuhn, 1962) approach, Feenberg argues that discourses of technological understanding, 
like scientific paradigms, emerge from “local” historical conceptions, and are interwoven with political and 
social projects. He asserts that the development of such an analysis is key to grasping a sense of 
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technology’s significance, asking “How can one study specific technologies without a theory of the larger 
society in which they develop?” (Feenberg, 2003). The categories Feenberg identifies, instrumentalism, 
determinism and substantivism, thus may offer a richer and more detailed account of the beliefs 
underpinning accounts of technology, and consequently ICT. 
 
Instrumentalism 
Feenberg states that the classical disciplines of the humanities exclude science and technology. It is 
only since the emergence of the discourses of modernity that accounts of technology have become more 
central. However, as Winner (1987) notes, such views of technology were largely instrumental, as 
technology was often subsumed under the rubric of “economics” or “politics”. This account of technology 
persists today, for, as Winner (1987, p. 2) states, there is still an open “tendency … to see the matter solely 
in terms of economics and economic history”.  In addition to the relegation of technology to a position 
subordinate to economics or politics, instrumental accounts of technology tend to centre on certain 
unchallenged assumptions. Winner (pp. 25-27) states that: “In the conventional perspective… technical 
means are by their nature mere tools subject to the will of whomever employs them.… Technology is 
essentially neutral. In the conventional way of thinking, the moral context appropriate to technical matters 
is clear. Technology is nothing more than a tool.”  
The instrumental understanding of technology holds that technology is “essentially neutral” and 
subservient. The idea of the neutrality of technology presupposes an established position of objective truth, 
one that has been discerned through scientific investigation. According to this idea, technological artefacts 
are different from cultural artefacts in that they are purely means-oriented, a position arising out of a view 
of technology as essentially progressive. Furthermore, in instrumental thought, as Feenberg (2003, p. 3) 
notes, technology “appears as purely instrumental, as value-free. It does not respond to inherent purposes, 
but is merely a means of serving subjective goals we choose as we wish”. Instrumentalist readings of 
technology still circulate widely within the more scientific disciplines and have proven quite influential in 
more positivist approaches to the study of communication (see for example Weaver and Shannon, 1963).  
 
Determinism 
Along with the instrumental reading of technology, a second and persistent understanding of 
technology is evident within the discourses of modernity. Broadly referred to as determinist, this category 
has as its mainstay a belief in the potential of technology to bring about social change on a macro or 
societal level. Technological determinism has proven a strong and persistent strand of thought in 
understanding the role of technology within modern Western thought even though it seems rarely to be 
explicitly stated. Marx and Smith (1996, pp. ix-xv)  contend: “A sense of technology’s power as a crucial 
agent of change has a prominent place in the culture of modernity. It belongs to the body of widely shared 
tacit knowledge that is more likely to be acquired by direct experience than by the transmittal of explicit 
ideas”. 
Similarly, Bimber proposes: “Technological determinism seems to lurk in the shadows of many 
explanations of the role of technology” (1996, p. 80). With regards to a general description of technological 
determinism, Heilbroner summarises the argument as follows: “Machines make history by changing the 
material conditions of human existence. It is largely machines… that define what it is to live in a certain 
epoch” (1996, p. 69).  Feenberg contends that such a trend emerged out of notions of progressivism within 
the Enlightenment and, more specifically, an engagement with the progressivism of Marx and even Darwin 
(2003, pp. 1-2). In post-Enlightenment European society, progress came to be broadly equated with an 
acknowledgement of technology’s power; “progressivism had become technological determinism” 
(Feenberg, pp. 1-2). 
This form of understanding has proven highly persistent and popular. It continues to manifest itself in 
numerous formats. For example, one particular and contemporary understanding equates the deployment of 
technology with improved social conditions. A number of populist accounts, for example Kawamoto 
(2003), regard the deployment of ICT as a necessary precursor to the development of a “knowledge 
economy” or “information society”. Several national governments have sought a rapid deployment of 
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technology in pursuit of economic and social development. For example, in a statement by the Welsh 
Assembly detailing its Information and Communication Strategy it is contended that: “Many of us are now 
using computers, mobile phones and the Internet…These technologies have the potential to transform 
society and the economy in Wales; they are already doing so in many parts of the world. The choices we 
make now—about which new technologies we use and, more importantly, how we use them—are crucial to 
the future of Wales and will help us to create a Better Wales!” (Welsh Assembly Government, 2003).  
Similarly, the Malaysian government has instigated, and to a degree acted upon, plans to “leapfrog into 
the Information Age”, developing a “Multimedia Super-Corridor”, a region of technological development 
incorporating purpose-built cities and a university all underpinned by highly developed technological 
infrastructure (Multimedia Development Corporation, 2000).  
 
Substantivism 
A range of attitudes broadly termed substantivist challenge the determinist belief in the neutrality and 
truth-revealing nature of technology (Feenberg, 2003, p. 2). As instrumentalism and determinism are 
understood to have emerged from empiricist and positivist tendencies within Enlightenment thought, 
substantivism is understood to have arisen from the distrust of technology and the reassertion of the 
“natural” found within Romanticist discourse. Similar to determinist discourse, substantivists contend that 
technology can directly intersect with and modify social life. However, substantivism avoids the utopian 
and optimistic tendencies that characterise determinist accounts and instead maintains deep reservations 
about technology. Technology is understood to, inherently, subjugate the user to systems not initially 
declared in the operation of the technology. Such a belief reaches its most eloquent form in Heidegger’s 
The Question Concerning Technology (1954). Heidegger proposes that technology is far from the neutral or 
simply goal-oriented system determinists or instrumentalists would claim. Rather: “we are delivered over to 
it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which 
today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology” (p. 4). 
Technology contains an “essence”: Heidegger envisages that technology is not about achieving goals 
but about revealing or bringing forth the use of a resource. However, “modern technology is fundamentally 
different from what Heidegger regards as ancient technology. The form of revealing is primarily different 
because of the physics-based nature of modern technology that allows for the ordering of a “standing 
reserve” at the behest of humans. This is opposed to the fundamental primacy of natural forces in old 
technology. However, Heidegger regards modern technology as inherently insidious, as humans do not 
control this; humans form part of the system of standing reserve. Humans are “enframed” by technology 
and technological systems and lose their freedom through their incorporation into technological systems. 
While Heidegger offers a radical reading of technology it lacks a sociologically “critical” aspect in that 
“fault” is understood to lie with modern technology as an entity as opposed to the more critical conflicts 
and power relations that underpin modernity.  
Substantivist thought also incorporates a spectrum of opinion that links the subjectifying nature of 
technology with specific political projects—a radicalising and politicising of Romantic thought. 
Technology is conceptualised as inherently political, Winner contends: “At issue is the claim that 
machines, structures, and systems of modern material culture can be accurately judged not only for their 
contributions of efficiency and productivity, not merely for their positive and negative side effects, but also 
for the ways in which they can embody specific forms of power and authority” (1996, p. 28). 
At the core of such claims lies a different conceptualisation of the nature and understanding of the 
origin of technological artefacts to that of the instrumentalists and the determinists. Here, in an engagement 
with Kuhnian theory, substantivism explicitly challenges the notion that technology is a truth-revealing (or 
revealed) phenomenon; on the contrary, technology arises from, and is broadly shaped by, society. 
Substantivists argue that technology cannot be distinctly discerned from other forms of cultural production 
and, as with all forms of cultural production, technology is inherently stained by the situation of its material 
and economic production.  
Substantivism offers a theory not only of the effects of technology upon society, but also of the effects 
of society upon technology. Qvortrup opines that new technology “cannot be properly understood if we 
persist in treating technology and society as two independent entities” (1984, p. 7). Technology needs to be 
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understood as a component of society. Consequently, and most importantly, technology is in essence 
determined by the society in which it originates. It is an artefact of a civilisation and not “a progressive 
quest towards truth”. Technology is not the neutral artefact presumed by instrumentalists and determinists. 
For a substantivist, technology is inherently compromised by its site of production. As Marcuse proposes: 
“Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology ‘subsequently’ and from the 
outside; they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a historical-social 
project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a 
‘purpose’ of domination is ‘substantive’ and to this extent belongs to the very form of technical reason” 
(italics in original, 1968, p. 224). 
It is in this critical and dystopian dimension, where technology contains the insidious “will” of its 
situation of manufacture, and where substantivist accounts are distinguished from the utopian progressive 
accounts of technology proffered by determinists. Technology is inherently a problematic system of control 
for substantivists, a form of instantiated power. Contrasted with the instrumental and determinist 
interpretations of technology, substantivism offers a highly pessimistic and critical reading of the further 
integration of social functions within systems of technology.  
The above-noted multiple forms of understanding of technology’s interaction with society constitute 
the general range of opinion on the topic. While the range of views examined is not exhaustive of the entire 
body of thought within the field, the beliefs and opinions cited can be considered to be representative of the 
general prevailing ideas in circulation and they can be seen to set out the parameters of the debate. 
 
The Alternate Model: ICT as Modal 
In examining the deep cultural and historical origin of the arguments surrounding technology, the very 
nature of the way in which technology, and consequently ICTs, are conceptualised is questioned. As 
technology may be interpreted in differing ways, a conceptual model of technology and ICT that allows for 
multiple interpretations is needed. 
In light of this, it is proposed that ICTs be regarded as contingent or modal forms of communication. It 
should be noted that this use of the terms “mode”, “modal” and “modality” is distinct from a number of 
other uses of the terms in media and communications theory. Rather than arguing that ICTs are a mode or 
form of communication or cultural transmission—it is proposed that the ICTs have modal quality in 
relation to their use, that they have different modes of use. As with Thompson (1990, pp. 216-264), it is 
argued that media, such as ICTs, are socially contingent means of communicating information and, 
following Kress and Van Leeuwen (2001), that the Internet itself is a mode of communication, or as Slevin 
(2000) proposes, that it is to be seen as a modality of cultural transmission.  
Therefore, the use of the term here is different. Modal refers to the multiple ways in which ICTs may 
be read, understood and used. Although ICTs may function in certain ways in some societies, they may not 
function in that way in all societies. ICTs may cause change and, as has been noted by numerous previous 
researchers, may bring about new ways of acting. However, we are contending that they may not do so in 
the same way in all societies, with the ability of technology to cause change being deeply linked to other 
aspects of social life. ICT, thus, is not understood as an asocial channel that passes information, regardless 
of the environment in which it is used. Instead it needs to be understood as deeply linked to the social 
systems and contexts in which it is used—ICT use depends upon the social environment.  
It is therefore proposed that, methodologically, ICTs be conceptualised in the following way: 
ICTs are a modal form of media and their use and appropriation may vary according to the 
environment in which they are used. Therefore, to examine ICTs, attention should be focused 
upon the interdependence of social systems, media technology and form of action studied. 
Like all technology, ICTs are not outside of society, they are interpreted, appropriated and used within 
social frameworks. Consequently there can be no single interpretation of the outcome of their use—they 
will not have the same effect in all places and at all times. We must, therefore, understand their use as 
deeply linked to the society in question.   
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 Adopting such a position involves stepping back from the direct acceptance of our view of technology 
or of our interpretation of what technology can do. It challenges the idea that either technology or society 
should be considered as a priori in conception. The focus of attention shifts from a focus upon the implicit 
potency of a technology to an analysis of how a society makes use of the technology. As noted above, it 
affords an opportunity to develop a social account of the use of ICT, an approach that integrates the 
potency of ICT within a social or sociological account of action. It is argued that the discipline of 
Community Informatics is well suited to, and will benefit from, developing a critical idiom that can 
examine the technological and sociological in concert rather than as discrete and distinct elements.  
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